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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Reply

T0 Respondent’s Nature Of The Case

Respondent
as Hillen

was

(still

t0

be referred t0 as “Hillen” for continuity within the brieﬁng and record,

the original Plaintiff,

now

replaced

by Ford

Elsaesser) contends the lower Court

determined that the Personal Representative (“PR”) had proven the required elements for

For that to be a “correct” legal conclusion, the lower Court must ﬁnd
“titled

owner” of Decedent’s property,

would not support such a

factual

as a matter of law,

ﬁnding 0r

Which the

that the

PR

is,

statutory authority

ej ectment.

in fact, the

and case law

legal conclusion, as neither the statute nor the case

history has ever placed “title” to the ownership of a Decedent’s property interests With a ﬁduciary;

as the Statute only allows a ﬁduciary to acquire possession t0 resolve creditor claims/ interested

persons, as

statutorily conferred

upon a Personal Representative under

the Idaho

Uniform Probate

Code.

By

Statute

and case law,

the devisees 0r heirs

Appellant’s Reply Brief

upon

title

and ownership

death, not

to assets

of a Decadent immediately vest with

any ﬁduciary. Appellant’s

P.
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father,

Vernon K. Smith

Jr.,

is

identiﬁed as the 2/3““ heir of Decedent’s property interests, and

a vested 2/3““

titled

has been the argument 0f Hillen

2001 Raymond Street property, and therefore, Appellant’s father

that Decedent’s assets include the

is

it

owner, not any

titled interest

made

held by Hillen. Through the arrangements

with Victoria H. Smith (Victoria) in year-2006 (who

now

is

the Decadent) and Appellant,

it

was

determined Appellant would be placed With possession 0f the property, commencing in year—2006,

and

retain possession thereafter,

under the arrangements upon which he has engaged the extensive

remodeling, renovation, restoration, preservation, and maintenance of the premises, along with his

father, as

it

always Victoria’s expressed and declared intentions that

son, Appellant’s father, but

entitled t0

now

ofwhich

there has never

and

costs, (these Distn'ct

been any creditors

his representatives to

assets,

and Appellant’s father will

will permit Appellant t0

Hillen has been pre-disposed t0

wasted fees and

property shall g0 to her one

this intestate disposition, Appellant’s father is a 2/3““ heir,

with

an in-kind distribution 0f Decedent’s

this premises, the effect

all

sell assets,

remain

retain full title t0

in possession.

having churned out an approaching $2 million in

Court proceedings being among the wasteﬁllness) knowing

in the Estate

and any tax

liability

have been resolved. The senseless

effect

has been represented by Hillen

of needless liquidations serves

only to create capital gains taxation on those funds exceeding the stepped-up basis, and there

need

to

compel the

2/3rd5 heir to

endure a needless tax assessment

when

the property

is

is

n0

to

be

retained and preserved.

The fundamental challenge

in this appeal

is

that Hillen cannot establish the requisite

“ownership” to the property, bound t0 establish “necessity” with the probate Court, as he does not
possess the element of “ownership”, Which

is

ﬁmdamental

never have initiated in District Court, as the matter
“necessity” element of the Statute.

Appellant’s Reply Brief

A

is

to

t0

an ejectment Action, Which he should

be addressed in probate Court under the

Plaintiff seeking “ejectment” in District

P. 5

Court must prove

“ownership”,

the ﬁrst of three elements to be proven in such a proceeding—thus a controlling

and the reason for

factor

conﬁrms “vested and

titled

this

appeal—as the

owners” of Decedent’s property are exclusively heirs and devisees, as

embodied Within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), and the
the titled and vested

cannot

own any

and chosen

owners—not ownership

heirs and/or devisees

t0 a Personal Representative,

part of a Decedent’s property assets, as historically

century ago in Lemp

Unless

and well-established case law

statutory authority

this

vLemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

P. 222,

to distinguish

what was thought

to

t0

elect t0 enter in

any attempt

View the matter

by

Statute, not to the Estate or

differently

“own any part

of”

pre-emptive t0 any Rule 70(b) entry a

t0 recover property interests transferred

previously. (July 4, 2012- June 2, 2017). Decedent’s ownership in this matter

the heirs,

in 1919, over a

be among the ﬁmdamental principles 0f law,

a Decedent’s property interests, which principle remains

may

of law,

.

expressed over a century ago in Lemp, supra, a Personal Representative cannot

Magistrate

as a matter

announced

223 (1919)1

make-up 0f the Idaho Supreme Court has come

Who,

of a Decedent are

ﬁve years

went exclusively

any ﬁduciary of the Estate. Once a Decedent’s

t0

interest is

established, the devolution 0f the ownership immediately transfers t0 the heirs or devisees,

pursuant to the Idaho Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and case law, never a ﬁduciary 0f the Estate.
In the narration of Respondent’s “Nature of the Case”, Hillen’s counsel asserts the lower

Court
to

it

ej ected

as the

Appellant ((hereinafter

“Raymond

St.

VKS III)

Property”.

A

more

from a “portion of Estate-owned property”, referring
“correct statement”

would be

VKS

III

was

ejected

1 John Lemp was
, Neiderweisel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Germany, Died July 18, 1912, Boise, Idaho,
(Unmarked, SE corner inside border), John Lemp arrived in the United States in 1852. He made his way t0 Idaho in
1863. Mr. Lemp opened a brewery in the area and was a signiﬁcant landowner. He was known as a generous giver
and was said t0 have personally paid for the burials 0f at least 20 area pioneers. He was a great reader 0f history and
was known for his unusual knowledge 0f historic facts. He was the president 0f First National Bank 0f Idaho for a
time. He served as a member 0f the constitutional convention and was a Boise City Council Member for 20 years.
leaving an Estate with an
Mr. Lemp served as Mayor of Boise for one year. He died in 1912 at the
estimated value of $800,000, the equivalent of almost (17) million dollars, today.

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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from property

that is exclusively

owned by

heirs 0f Decedent, as only heirs or devisees are “titled

owners” of a Decedent’s property. The lower Court entered Judgment 0n the Pleadings (Motion
JOTP), thereby

ej ecting

VKS

III

from the Raymond

preserved residential facility performed by
(year—2006-to the present),

owned

VKS

III

property, a fully remodeled/renovated and

St.

and

his father over a substantial period

by Decedent’s

exclusively

for

heirs,

0f years

and exclusively possessed by

VKS III since year-2006, fulﬁlling his commitment to his grandmother and father.
The pleadings 0f Record

owned

assert Hillen

the facility, wherein he claimed “exclusive

ownership” by Virtue 0f the controversial Rule 70(b) Instrument entry by the Magistrate 0n June

2,

2017, an Instrument that remains Violative 0f both the Statute and the established case law.
Hillen has described the “Nature of the Case” in the following manner:

Vernon III—but mostly his attorney Vernon—claims the Estate, acting through the
PR, lacks the authority to eject an unwanted party from Estate—owned property.
Cutting through Vernon III’s/Vernon’s irrelevant and incorrect facts and points, the
disposition 0f this appeal amounts t0 a single issue: does the PR have the authority, as
personal representative, t0 eject an unwantedpartyfrom Estate property. (Emphasis
added). (Resp. Brief, P. 2)

This

is

worded almost

identically to the

argument addressed by Hillen in the Gibson appeal,

as cited in the pending appeal entitled Hillen v Gibson,

Ada County Case No. CV01-19-10368.

Hillen, the original Plaintiff in this appeal

appeal, never expressed his authority rested

an unwanted party
ownership” t0

all

ﬁom

Supreme Court Docket No. 47687-2020,
and the Gibson

0n the objective of a Personal Representative

estate properly”. Hillen’s allegation has

to “eject

been he held the “exclusive

0f Decedent’s property, an entitlement he claims bestowed upon him by the Rule

70(b) Instrument entered

by

the Magistrate

0n June

2,

2017, relying upon that Instrument t0

advance the pre-requisite of his claim for ejectment, as “ownership”, must be established to provide
standing t0 eject

VKS III from his possession of property.

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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Hillen

knew he had

t0

prove “ownership” t0 establish a factual basis t0 sustain a claim for

ejectment, never did Hillen assert

heirs, as

VKS

III to

be “an unwanted party” by

either the

Decadent 0r the

VKS III has been a critical beneﬁt to the property’s protection and preservation since year-

2006, just as Gibson had been

critical

with respect t0 the

Gowen Field property

since year—2004.

This “idea” of a “personal representative having authority t0 eject an unwantedpartyfrom
Estate property”

is

now

Hillen’s “evolving” approach in this appeal, realizing neither the Statute

nor the case law supports his

and contradiction

“titled

ownership” theory, and the 70(b) Instrument

an aberration

is

t0 the controlling law.

Hillen, in his capacity as a Personal Representative, has certain rights relative t0 a

need for

possession, but only t0 the extent expressed within the limitations and restrictions 0f the Idaho

Uniform Probate Code NFC),

as

have been articulated Within Appellant’s Opening

Brief,

and as

referenced further hereinafter.

For Hillen t0 get Where he went, Hillen needed

embrace the eIToneously worded and

t0

over—reaching Rule 70(b) Instrument, which incorrectly placed “ownership” with Hillen, not the
heirs as required

by

Statute

and case law.

Hillen realizes his conundrum,

segment of his

Brief,

now

electing to stray

no longer relying upon

from “ownership” as discussed

his earlier posture

where he argued

“I

own

it”,

in this

to

now

postulating “the disposition 0fthis appeal amounts t0 a single issue: does Hillen have the authority,

as personal representative, t0 eject an

The answer

t0 that issue/question

Estate property under the

UPC,

is

it

unwanted party from Estate properly”. (Resp.

forthcoming from the Statute and case law:

is titled

t0

and vested

in the heirs,

authority to take any action to even take possession without a

authority of a century 01d, a ﬁduciary cannot

Appellant’s Reply Brief

own any part 0f a
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and a

It is

PR

Brief, P. 2).

not

titled as

does not have

showing 0f necessity, and by the

Decedent’s property

interests.

The

“unwanted Party from Estate property” was not

his allegation in his pleadings,

nor his argument to

the lower court.

This present “issue”

now

being announced by Hillen

is

not the concept articulated or

advocated in Hillen’s pleadings and brieﬁng t0 the lower Court, and not an issue that has been
reserved for appeal 0r t0 be found in the

[in his appeal]

nor

VKS

III

statutory right “t0 ej ect an

VKS

III

record on appeal. This Court will not

have been alleged

in this appeal t0

unwanted party from Estate property”,

t0

ﬁnd Gibson

be “an unwanted party”, with a

as that

was never alleged, and they

each were beneﬁcial occupants 0f the respective properties 0n Which they were authorized by the

Decedent

to possess in years—2004

As Appellant
be

that Hillen is

Gibson appeal,

stated in the

n0 longer claiming
be such,

statutorily declared to

ej ectment

and 2006 respectively.

t0

be the

“titled

his ejectment action

VKS

III

does maintain in

owner” 0f the property,

must

fail,

this appeal, if

it

now

realizing the heirs are

as “ownership” is

ﬁmdamental

to

an

from the Raymond

St.

Action.

Hillen

is

0n record

property, never declared

as the only person wanting to eliminate

by anyone

t0

VKS

III

be “an unwanted party”. Neither the Decedent, during any 0f

the seven (7) years preceding Victoria’s death, nor anyone of interest in the property, has ever

regarded

VKS

III to

be other than a valuable asset and a

restoration/renovation arrangements.

unwanted party”,

as

N0

heir has ever

Vital

beneﬁt to the property under the

gone on record

to say

VKS

III

is

“an

VKS III has remodeled, restored and preserved the property, creating its market

valuation, just as With

Gibson on the

and Vernon, before her death, and
property from value diminution

Appellant’s Reply Brief

Gowen

Field property, always an asset and beneﬁt t0 Victoria

clearly to the heirs’

.
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beneﬁt since her death, protecting the

Hillen merely seeks t0 liquidate properties, Without demonstrating any necessity under the
Statute t0 take possession

from the

Estate and any federal estate tax

heirs,

and Hillen

is

well aware there were n0 creditors in the

was represented t0 have been

Hillen chooses t0 act outside the

satisﬁed.

UPC and in contradiction of well-established case law, now

evolving from this mis—guided assertion of being the “exclusive

titled

owner”, [asserting the

exclusion of an heir], to his evolving theory in this appeal [advanced in the Gibson appeal as well]

now

asserting he

is

cloaked with authority “t0 eject an unwanted party from Estate property”,

though no such authority

is

placed with a ﬁduciary under the

UPC, and such

meet the requirements of an ejectment claim long recognized
Dist.

v.

Inc. v

in law. (See

proposition does not

Ada County Highway

Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369,179 P.3d 323,332 (2008));

Mid—Mile Holding

Trust, 131

Pro

Indiviso,

Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998); Petty v Petty, 7O

Idaho 473, 223 P.2d 158 (1950), wherein the Plaintiff must allege and prove the element 0f
ownership.

Both

in this appeal,

Gowen Field 0r Raymond

and Gibson appeal, Hillen has not

St. t0

be property “owned” by an

articulated with statutory clarity that

Estate. If we

go by the Statute and case

law, the heirs are declared the exclusive owners, not any Estate.

Hillen

was aware “ownership” was an element he had

to allege

and prove, or he could not

establish standing to prevail in an ejectment Action. Thus, the reason Hillen claimed ownership

advancing the Rule 70(b) Instrument of June
titled

owner”. Having

Gibson 0r

wanted

VKS

party”.

now abandoned

III (their

He

has

2,

his theory of ownership,

make

Where

Hillen the “exclusive

in the

Record 0f

either

respective appeals) Will ﬁt be found an allegation either to be “an un-

now abandoned one

theory,

for review.

Appellant’s Reply Brief

2017, purporting t0

by
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and has not preserved

his

new

evolving theory

Consequently, and relying upon the actual Record developed in this appeal, the issue hovers

over What authority,

championed
III

if any, the

Rule 70(b) Instrument provided Hillen any

his entire proposition to the

from the Raymond

St.

reliance,

and What Hillen

lower Court to secure his Judgment for ejectment of VKS

property.

This appeal directly challenges Hillen’s use 0f that 70(b) Instrument, and the conﬁrmation

of the invalidity of that Instrument for the purpose Hillen has employed

its

application, as Hillen,

by

established law, cannot be a “titled “owner” 0f any 0f Decedent’s property, and the lower Court

cannot embrace an “ownership” theory,

when

Hillen

Representative of an Estate, since a ﬁduciary cannot

the Estate,

statutory enactment, does not

by

The

Statute restricts

and

have

title

“acting” in the capacity as a Personal

is

own

to 0r

the property

(Lemp v Lemp supra), and

ownership of a Decedent’s property.

limits Hillen t0 the provisions enacted Within the

his right to take possession of property, restricted to speciﬁc circumstances,

here or have been established t0 exist here.

The

UPC,

limited in

none of which

exist

limitations require a Personal Representative

demonstrate “necessity” before a probate Court to take possession 0f property for the satisfaction of
creditors

instead

and other interested persons, and Hillen has not done

went

and other

t0 District

that with the probate Court, but

Court 0n his theory 0f ownership and pursued an ejectment Action in

this

cases.

The

UPC requires a Personal Representative t0 resolve valid and approved claims within the

administration of the Estate, and in this Estate, there has never been any creditor claims or un—settled

interests to address.

When

there are

require liquidation 0f an asset,

Where

n0

creditor claims

when he cannot

than mis—use of the Instrument that violates the

Appellant’s Reply Brief

in the Estate to

in the Statute has the legislature granted the authority for a

Personal Representative t0 ﬁle an ejectment Action

interest, other

and no interested party

P. 11

allege

and prove an ownership

statute, the

case law, and should be

deemed void

and due process of law under the Statute

for lack ofjurisdictional authority

t0 disrupt

the devolution 0f property interests.

For Hillen to propose there

is

but this “single issue” t0 be decided in this appeal—Whether

Hillen has authority to eject an “unwanted party from estate properly”, notwithstanding Hillen’s

failure t0 raise

and preserve such a proposition

for review, in

What manner does such a proposition

support the fundamental element 0f an ejectment Action—ownership of the property? Hillen

obligated

by

the law as a ﬁduciary t0 protect and preserve the Estate assets; the scales are tipped

is

by

Hillen consistently engaging in a behavior 0f liquidating Estate assets and destroying a historical

legacy preceding the Decadent and the Estate heirs. This negligent behavior of liquidating Estate
assets serves

no

interest in the preservation

owner” must be deemed by
appeal.

When

property,

how

engaged an

this

0f the Estate. Hillen’s proposition that he

is

the “titled-

Court to be outside the Record, and not within the issues raised 0n

the law says Hillen cannot, and

by

does not,

Statute, the Estate

own

a Decedent’s

can that be disregarded by a Personal Representative, and Hillen be allowed t0

ej ectment

Action, foregoing the statutory pre-requisite to establish a necessity in probate

Court t0 take possession of property in the administration of the Estate?
If

and

it

be apparent

now embraces

to this

Court that Hillen has abandoned his “exclusive ownership” theory,

the Statute that vests

title

and possession with the

heirs, is this

Court inclined to

take up Hillen’s evolving proposition that a Personal Representative has authority “t0 eject an

unwanted party from

estate properly”,

when no such

proposition

was

raised below,

nowhere

identiﬁed in the Record 0n appeal, never addressed in Hillen’s Pleadings ﬁled below, and n0 Statute
0r case law has declared a Decedent’s interests t0 be Estate property—only t0 be administered for
the beneﬁt 0f the beneﬁciaries,

Appellant’s Reply Brief

Who

are titled owners? Is there a statutory conﬂict 0f interest
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Where

Title

vests

the

in

heirs,

and the Powers delegated

t0

the

Personal Representative in the

Administration of the Estate?
If Hillen is converting his

“ownership theory”, and

What elements

now

Action from that of ejectment, n0 longer relying on his alleged

claiming a right t0 “eject an unwanted party from estate property”,

Will this Court require Hillen t0 allege

below

t0 attain the standing for

an ejectment

Action, Without demonstrating necessity in the administration of the Estate?

If Hillen

the titled

no longer claims

status as

an “owner”, where in the Statute does

owner 0f the property 0f a Decedent? This now requires

address his proposition if there

Arguably,

it is

is

“estate property”

it

say an Estate

statutory interpretation t0

from which an un—wanted party could be

the heir that has standing to bring an ejectment Action, but

nor an Estate has the “ownership” interest in the Decedent’s

assets,

When

is

even

ej ected.

neither a ﬁduciary

What Hillen has done cannot be

embraced by this Court.
If the Statute is t0

question, and

be enforced, when there are no creditor claims, n0 other

no identiﬁed tax

liability to justify

interests in

need for a Personal Representative

possession t0 resolve outstanding claims, the ﬁduciary

is

to seek

Without authority t0 dispossess those

who

are protecting the heirs’ interest in the property.

Neither a Magistrate, nor a lower Court, has the authority to abrogate the limitations the

Idaho legislature has adopted through enactment 0f the Uniform Probate Code, and cannot modify
the plain reading and

meaning of the

statutory provisions pertaining to the ownership 0f Decedent’s

property interests.

Without the assertion

and Hillen
statutorily

is

only

left to

g0

t0 ownership, there is

no allegation

t0 support

t0 the Magistrate t0 demonstrate a necessity t0 take possession for a

recognized reason, the only avenue a ﬁduciary has under the

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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UPC,

yet Hillen prefers to

forum shop, using an Instrument crafted by a Magistrate

that exceeds

any statutory authority, having

abrogated the due process procedural mandates, contradicting the statutory devolution 0f ownership

mandated by the provisions 0f the
devisees

UPC

that immediately vest

title

and ownership with the heirs or

upon death of the Decedent.

The

“real concern” presented

by

Hillen’s version of the “Nature 0f the Case”,

is

his

transformation or transmutation of his Action from “exclusive ownership” t0 “a right to eject an

unwanted party from Estate property” (Resp.
effect that transformation 0r evolution has

Brief, P. 2),

and the question then becomes —what

on his cause 0f action below?

Hillen has acknowledged he has found himself in the midst 0f a

created, pursuing

2,

an

ej ectment

2017. If that Instrument

conundrum he alone has

Action upon ownership he contends the Magistrate gave him on June

is statutorily

ineffective because

it

has been entered in contradiction t0

the Statute and case law, lacking any authority to engage such a disposition

then

is

the lawful basis for Hillen t0 implore and use

If Hillen has

relief

abandoned

his allegation

he obtained below under

this

T0

address What Hillen

Magistrate, where

it?

of “ownership”, can there be any right to obtain the

ejectment Action? This appeal has been presented t0 this

reviewing Court upon the Record from Which the
granted.

by a

now wants to

ej ectment

Judgment and Writ 0f Assistance were

call his “single issue”,

element required t0 sustain an ejectment Action?

We

does Hillen

forfeit the essential

cannot walk away from the cause of

this

controversy—the Instrument Hillen relied upon t0 make his allegation in the lower Court, as Hillen
expressly relied

upon

it,

and threatens the standing in other

litigation,

and

this

Instrument

is

the

essence of What brought this controversy below and t0 this Court, stemming from Hillen’s reliance

upon

the Rule 70(b) Instrument below, and has

now become

being the perceived authority for Hillen’s claim

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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an integral component 0f this appeal,

when he ﬁled

the Action in the lower Court, the

sole

key

to his

ownership theory, n0

Statute,

n0 case law, just the Instrument he

relied

upon

that

he

claimed the Rule 70(b) Instrument vested him the “ownership” and authority t0 do What he wanted
With the property—absent any statutory authority or case law for what he sought to accomplish.
Hillen’s “single

issue”— a

right t0 eject an

un-wanted party from Estate property—was

never raised below, nor ascertainable from Within the allegations 0f the ejectment Action ﬁled
Hillen used the Rule 70(b) Instrument to claim himself the “exclusive titled owner” from

below.

which the element he needed

t0

and prove was forthcoming.

allege

new-found

If this

transformation, from “ownership” t0 “a right t0 eject an un—wanted party from Estate property”,

where

is

the fundamental element to be alleged and proved in an ejectment

be addressed and decided in

T0
unwanted

Hillen’s

party”,

this

appeal?

new theory—When was

When he

action—ownership—to

it,

and by

whom was it determined VKS

has beneﬁtted the property interests 0f the heir(s)?

III

When

became “an

did

VKS

III’s

beneﬁcial possession and/occupancy of a parcel of property he has protected and preserved been
declared to be un—wanted?

Why would any heir want to jeopardize

that a Personal Representative could foolishly

more expensive
and

repair?

VKS

III

to the heirs since year—2013,

the integrity of the property, so

expose property t0 more rental damage and need for

has served a very beneﬁcial purpose and service since year—2006

and for the

entire period

of his 14-year possession/occupancy, With

the approval, consent, and pursuant t0 the arrangement between Victoria and

VKS

III’s father, t0

the present.

Would
titled

it

be reasonable

ownership” 0f the

Raymond

has granted the ejectment 0f

Appellant’s Reply Brief

t0

conclude that

St.

VKS

if Hillen

has abandoned the theory 0f “exclusive

property, has he consented t0 the reversal of the

III

upon

Judgment that

the abandoned theory 0f Hillen’s ownership 0f the
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property? Despite Hillen’s belief this appeal

have been raised remain the issues
1.

t0

is

about his “single issue”, the fundamental issues that

be decided by

this

court—identiﬁed as the following:

In the absence of any established and demonstrated need for the liquidation of assets
in the administration

0f an

estate,

as determined under I.C.

§15-3-71

1,

does a

Personal Representative have any authority within the general provisions 0f the Idaho
Uniform Probate Code, LC. §15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject Appellant VKS III from
his otherwise lawful possession

the heirs 0f the Estate,

Under

the

to taking

and

0f property that by law (LC. §15-3-101)

his presence is

deemed

essential

by

is

vested in

the 2/3““ heir?

a Personal Representative ever "own" estate property, as opposed

UPC, can

and holding "possession" 0f that property
of their claims?

in trust for the

beneﬁt 0f creditors

in satisfaction

have any authority t0 transfer "ownership"
a Personal Representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P. Order?

Does a Magistrate
0f property t0

.

Does

in a probate proceeding

announced in I.C. §15-3-709 apply t0 a
Personal Representative’s pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of property, as
opposed t0 a pleading t0 obtain "possession" 0f property, for satisfaction 0f creditor
Claims as an estate administration necessity, t0 which the "conclusive evidence"
standard was intended t0 apply under that section?
the "conclusive evidence" standard

deemed

be the sole owner 0f Decedent’s property, as a consequence 0f
the Rule 70(b) Order, then on what basis does Hillen remain subj ect t0 the statutorilystated trust obligations he owes to Decedent’s heir whose interest has been allegedly
If Hillen is

t0

divested as result 0f the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order?

deemed

be the sole owner of Decedent’s property as a consequence of
the Rule 70(b) Order, then 0n What basis does the “divested” heir, Vernon K. Smith
Jr. retain standing to challenge 0r seek restraint 0f the un—authorized actions
attempted by Hillen to sell the heirs’ property without any showing of necessity
If Hillen is

Which becomes a
Hillen’s

reliance

to

factual dispute?

upon

the

Rule 70(b) Instrument to advocate for ejectment, has

necessarily raised the question as t0 the jurisdictional validity of the Rule 70(b) Instrument that

gave Hillen his theory 0f such entitlement t0 get

this

controversy t0 this stage before the Idaho

Supreme Court.
B. Reply

T0 Respondent’s “Course

Appellant’s Reply Brief

0f Proceedings”:

P. 16

Hillen has incorporated a similar passage he recited in the Gibson appeal, referring t0 a

Holographic Will and

transfers.

When

in this appeal Within the following

referencing the Estate Case. Hillen presents his

commentary

manner:

After Victoria’s death, Judge Copsey,

who

is

presiding over Victoria’s estate case

(the “Estate Case”): (1) invalidated Victoria’s will as the product of undue inﬂuence
(2) set aside a series of transactions by which Vernon transferred all
0f Victoria’s property t0 himself 0r entities controlled by him. Id. at 465-66, 432
P.3d at 14-15. After issuing these rulings, Judge Copsey appointed Hillen as personal

by Vernon; and

representative 0f the Estate,

and entered judgment, pursuant

t0 Idaho

Rule 0f Civil

Procedure 70(b), which, for present purposes, vested title t0 the Raymond St.
Property in the PR. (R. 159-160). That Judgment is referred to herein as the “Rule 70
Judgment”. (Highlighted emphasis added, Resp Brief, P. 2)

The

transfers

were conducted as Victoria requested and as she directed over months of

discussion. Hillen’s assertion “for present purposes, vested

PR”,

is

upon

for his claimed ownership, the basis

the core

component

in this

appeal—the reference

title

to the

Raymond

Property in the

St.

t0 the 70(b) Instrument that Hillen relied

upon which Hillen

initiated the ejectment

Action against

VKS III.
Hillen has chosen t0 say

by him” (Respondent’s

controlled

Properties,

transfers,

Vernon

LLC,

at his

“transferred

Brief, p. 2).

all

0f Victoria’s property to himself or

Vernon fonned the limited

Mother’s request, using her

initials,

liability

entities

company,

VHS

to speciﬁcally trace the property

with joint interest to reﬂect Vernon’s decades of ﬁnancial/personal contributions, and

effectuating her decision that

Vernon take ownership, contemplated by her long-held

intentions,

expressed by her intentions Within her Holographic Will she created over two decades before 0n
Valentine’s day in 1990. There

was nothing

nefarious

by these

transfers, as

it

was What Victoria

requested and had wanted to occur, and consistent with her expressed objectives for decades.
consistent With the

way

she envisioned devolution, and the involvement between Vernon and his

Mother, as described by Victoria’s daughter, “they were a team”, from the passing 0f her husband

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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and Vernon’s Father

in 1966, a period over 47-years, they acted together, apparently a healthy

parent—child relationship Hillen cannot, 0r choses not, t0 understand.

This propensity of Hillen to portray events about which he has no historical awareness and
speculation,

is

part of

what promotes the controversial environment with the disappointment of

Hillen’s conduct While acting as the Personal Representative in Victoria’s Estate, With Hillen

fueling discord With his conduct

and behavior.

Since Hillen recites speculation, a few facts are in order. Victoria’s Holographic Will was

crafted

by

0n Valentine’s day, February

Victoria

expressions 0f her intentions, later

conﬁrmed

it

14, 1990, the

day she chose

was her symbolic way 0f choosing

express, in writing, her intentions relating t0 her children, reﬂecting

but not

all,

for her

own reasons. She gave t0

t0 hand-write her

that

upon her commitment

day

to

t0 one,

each previously, but speciﬁcally cherished one son

who

provided his devotion and commitment t0 protect her and preserve her interests for those decades
following the death of her husband in the year-1966.

children,

and With her own tenacious and stubborn

Valentine’s day, t0

commit

to writing

progressed over the decades, a fact

Who

was her decision

disposition, elected t0

what had been her long-held

t0

make, knowing her

do what she did on

intentions watching

by

has revealed her awareness 0f the family dynamics, and disclosed her

their discussions as t0

t0 the

son she

Why. Hillen knows these

knew their Mother wanted t0

Joseph,

Who

his

what had

Victoria’s daughter, Victoria Converse, residing in

discussions With Joseph that took place in 1992, discussing their dis—inheritance

and

that

known to each of her children.

Hillen has received the emails written

Portland, Oregon,

It

facts

by

their

Mother,

from an heir, who has assigned her

interest

receive the interests.

Mother would say had

less than

a casual acquaintance With the truth,

deceived the Court by saying he was u_naware of his exclusion, though discussed in year—199O 0n

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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two occasions and

later

with Victoria Converse again in year—1992, having

known

decades his exclusion, well aware there was no inﬂuence, a fact Victoria Converse
Hillen and his

attorneys,

appreciation and devotion

Vernon was

as

was

Victoria’s

made

two

clear to

which loyalty Victoria’s

for

salvation,

for over

unyielding.

was very

detailed in her revelations to Hillen,

conﬁrming Joseph’s

character, also reﬂected in responding letters Victoria wrote t0 Joseph, all

of which Hillen had

Victoria Converse

access, yet Hillen declines t0 recite

an

what an heir Wictoria Converse) knows and

says, expressed in

effort t0 correct this injustice.

Instead, because

0f Vernon’s criticism 0f Hillen’s gross mis—conduct, Hillen would rather

perpetuate and broadcast a false narrative t0 portray negative perceptions to the Court, petty

retaliation

because 0f Vernon’s disappointment with Hillen’s behavior and destruction 0f the

property interests Vernon has spent his entire adult

legacy

left

life

protecting and saving; and the historical

by Vernon K. Smith, Sn, and the Decedent.

Victoria Converse explained to Hillen that

Vernon had no reason 0r need

to

inﬂuence his

Mother, instead behaving as an obedient and loyal son, the attributes every Mother would cherish in
a son. For that loyalty and devotion, Vernon

wanted him to have

for his decades

Does not a Mother have a

Whom she

shall

is

criticized for reaping the righteous

of funding, preservation and salvation.
right t0 praise 0r criticize her

bestow What? Could

it

read the testimony of Carolyn Puckett,

own

children and decide

upon

be that Hillen has not been a cherished son? Hillen needs

who

the Magistrate forgot t0 embrace,

long before, during, and long after Victoria had created her

own

relationship.
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who knew

t0

Victoria

Holographic Will, frequently

expressing t0 Ms. Puckett Victoria’s intentions openly t0 Carolyn for

Appellant’s Reply Brief

reward a Mother

many

years throughout their

and read Victoria Convers’s emails, should take heed 0f her

Hillen, having received

integrity, driven

righteously

known

by her

tenacity

and stubbornness

came by from her Mother, and

intentions,

Hillen has been

and

made

Intestate interest to

it

to reveal the truth, a character trait she so

was her assumed duty

t0 restore Within her capability

to respect her Mother’s well-

what Victoria sought

to achieve, a fact that

aware, and to demonstrate her true sincerity, Victoria Converse assigned her

Vernon, her contribution to restore the destruction taking place by

this injustice

committed upon her Mother’s most personal and heartfelt Holographic Will.

With

now

the destruction of Victoria’s expressed intentions maintained for over

are to endure Hillen’s imprudent

trans-mutated theory

more of

VKS

III

comments

to

were nefarious

was “an un—wanted party” and

Hillen’s disappointing behavior, for

commentary only serves

that there

add

t0 the

t0

two decades, we

transfers, but

now

the

be ejected from “Estate property”,

Which he deserves

t0

be

ridiculed. This type

disenchantment that demonstrates Hillen

is

0f

truly not suited t0

be a Personal Representative, and simply needs to be removed 0r replaced—Which he has.
Neither Joseph nor Hillen were around to see, be involved with, ﬁnance, protect, or preserve
anything, and Hillen appears inclined t0 defeat and destroy everything that

stood

for,

Vernon and Victoria

wanting to liquidate What they spend nearly a half century protecting and preserving, With

neither a necessity or a legitimate purpose to continue liquidating, and perceived to be in total

dereliction

of Hillen’s ﬁduciary

responsibilities, his limited authority

and the

relating t0 liquidating property interests, deliberately destroying the interests

statutory restrictions

of the 2/3““ heir 0f the

Decedent.
Hillen

knows

these property assets were ﬁnanced, funded, protected, and preserved

Vernon, and Without one penny from Joseph, and With n0 estate creditors t0 confront 0r
disbursements from this Estate

Appellant’s Reply Brief

is

by

satisfy, the

approaching $2 million taken by Hillen and his cadre 0f attorneys
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for needless

and wasteful “administrative fees and expenses”, the reason

liquidate unique property for

taxation for

actually

no beneﬁt

to

no reason but

an

entry, the basis

Which Hillen seeks

t0

in the process creating capital gains

upon another challenged

heir, relying

afﬁrmed the Rule 70(b)

and

t0 churn fees,

for

belief this

Supreme Court

upon Which Hillen claims ownership,

as

he has

stated in the Respondent’s Brief:

Vernon appealed
transfers,

the invalidation of the Will, the decision t0 set aside the property

and the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter ofEstate omeith,

appeal, this Court considered “any matters occurring

up

t0

supra.

As part of that

and including the

post-trial

466, 432 P.3d at 15 (2018). After such
consideration, this Court concluded that “the decisions 0f the magistrate court are

judgment under Rule 70(b).”

at

Id.

482, 432 P.3d at 3 1. (Emphasis added)

afﬁrmed.

Id. at

N0 party

appealed the Rule 70(b) Instrument, and this Court did not rule upon

and void

of that Instrument, which notably was entered in Violation of

status 0r the enforceability

the Statute and case law. Hillen relies entirely

upon

this

2017, as being the sole basis for his “ownership”, and

and aﬁirmed by this Supreme
the Rule 70(b) Instrument,

invalidity

its

Rule 70(b) Instrument, entered on June

now

arguing that Instrument was addressed

Court, the effect 0f which “vested exclusive ownership” in

afﬁrmed

in the

2,

Supreme Court Decision,

him under

establishing ownership 0f

Decedent’s property interests with him, as the Personal Representative, something that neither the
Statute permits, nor the well-established case

It is

because of

law would support 0r allow.

this un—substantiated proposition this

Instrument, and embrace the only intended purpose
the Statute and case law?

Or was

it

it

Court must address the Rule 70(b)

was designed to accomplish. Was

it

to Violate

a poorly informed Magistrate’s attempt t0 restore Decedent’s

ownership t0 property, from Which the statutory scheme 0f devolution would transfer the statutory
ownership from there, in accordance with the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)?

The only purpose of
interests,

the Rule 70(b) Instrument

previously transferred t0

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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was

LLC

to re-transfer

0n July

4,

Decedent’s property

2012, back t0 the Grantor,

Victoria H. Smith, Who,

interests

heirs.

would be

by

Uniform Probate Code took

then, being deceased, the

statutorily transferred

The poorly conceived

over,

and the

under the enacted statutory scheme 0f devolution to the

crafting of the Instrument transferred

suggesting the magistrate did not have knowledge 0f the
property interests, as such Rule 70(b) Instrument

is

title

of property to Hillen,

UPC vestiture mandates

0f Decedent’s

expressly in contradiction to the Statute and

case law.
Hillen has chosen to fashion his authority from this statutorily un—authorized creativity,

and engage

in a statutorily inconsistent assertion

he IS the

“titled

owner” 0f Decedent’s

because of the language contained within the Rule 70(b) Instrument 0f June

2,

assets

2017.

Hillen has ﬁled four separate Actions in District Court, asserting use 0f this Rule 70(b)
Instrument, and this appeal being the second such action, has been based 0n the statutorily
inconsistent Rule 70(b) Instrument, and Hillen ‘forum shopping’ these ejectment Complaints

outside of the probate Court, With

Whom it was thought the

jurisdiction with the Magistrate Court over the Estate

C. Relief Appellant Requests Regarding

It

is

essential, t0 prevent

Supreme Court

The Rule

and the

heirs’ interests.

70(b) Instrument

proceedings from becoming complicated further, for this

to address the erroneous vesture

ﬂawed Rule

Personal Representative by the

Supreme Court had placed exclusive

of title/ownership of Decedent’s assets in the

70(b) Instrument.

The

Statute

and case law declares

a Decedent’s assets are titled and vested with the heirs of the Decadent, Where

been

statutorily required,

title

has always

even long before the adoption 0f the Uniform Probate Code.

never been With a Personal Representative, who, according t0 long-established law, cannot

Decedent’s assets. See

Such

Lemp

conﬁrmation
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v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

of

and

statutory

P.
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case

law

P. 222,

does

It

has

own

a

223 (1919).

not

Violate

the

Personal

Representative’s

authority

0f

administration,

Representative’s administrative authority

is

but

does

serve

to

conﬁrm

Personal

a

limited and restricted t0 the statutory requirements

mandated within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and case law.
It

requires a Personal Representative t0 go before the probate Court t0 consider issues

relating to sale

and possessory

rights over properties,

distribution,

and

initiate carte

blanche liquidations in District Court where

commencement of ejectment Actions does not

address probate restraints, but only 100k to

not allow a Personal Representative to
the

and the preferred in-kind

the elements in an ejectment Action, the ﬁrst 0f

Which

District Court, not the issue in a probate proceeding

creditor claims exist t0 be satisﬁed. This

is

—0wnership—is

where necessity

the very reason Hillen

went

is

the focus 0f the

the issue and

t0 the District

what

Court and

by-passed the probate Court that was thought to have the exclusive jurisdiction t0 address the
relevant aspects under the

obligation t0

statutory

D.

Uniform Probate Code. The Personal Representative has the

comply With the

UPC

statutory

and be consistent with the application of due process and

mandates and case law.

What Has Been The Unintended Consequence Of The Rule 70

(b)

Instrument ?

This ruling, as currently reﬂected in the Instrument entered by the Magistrate on June

2017, created an un-authorized disposition Decedent’s property become

owned by

2,

the Personal

Representative of the Estate. Hillen’s current use 0f this Instrument deﬁes the objectives 0f the

Uniform Probate Code UPC), ignoring necessity
creditor claims

among

to take possession

of property, the need for

and un-satisﬁed debt, and ignoring the preferred in-kind distribution 0f assets

the heirs,

Who

hold the vested and

titled

ownership

interest

of Decedent’s property.

This disregard has enabled Hillen t0 act freely t0 wrongfully liquidate property interests

entirely,

when

the Statute and case law declares the heirs t0 be the vested owners, and Hillen’s

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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behavior has been contrary t0 the objectives 0f the

UPC

and

of the 2/3““

that

heir, as that heir

has always sought t0 preserve assets, not liquidate them.
Hillen has been a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, his professional experience, and in that
capacity, pursues liquidation 0f assets, acting

0n behalf 0f the

creditors in a

Bankruptcy Estate.

The obligation of Hillen,

as a Personal Representative, are vastly different; in this Estate there

were no

creditors,

interests

the duty

must be

and the

of the rights and desires of the heirs must be considered, and

t0 preserve assets for the heirs.

Hillen, acting

upon

this perception

of his un-fettered ownership, has caused these

needless civil Actions t0 be ﬁled in the District Court, three (3) of which are on appeal to the

Idaho Supreme Court. These Actions exist only because 0f the erroneous placement of title With
Hillen,

which vesture under the Instrument must be declared invalid and void. Otherwise,

vesting

title

in this

the provisions

manner conﬂicts with

the statutory and jurisdictional authority to effectuate

of the UPC, Which statutory authority must be held to control property

ownership.

The Rule 70(b) Instrument

is

in direct Violation

0f existing case law, vesting ownership

of a decedent’s property in a personal representative violates case law (Lemp, supra),

Who can

only act solely in the capacity as a ﬁduciary, holding no ownership in the Decedent’s property,

and as such must act as a trustee within the provisions,

The
is

restrictions,

authority, pursuant to the administration 0f

an

estate

and limitations 0f the UPC.

by a Personal Representative,

limited to possession of such assets only under certain limited circumstances 0f necessity to

satisfy, in trust,

any existing creditor claims. There were n0

Vernon resolved

all

debts, liabilities,

creditors’ claims in this Estate, as

and potential claims 0f both

his Father

and

his

Mother

long before the death of Decedent. The only obligation came to be the federal taxing authority
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and the administrative expenses generated by Hillen and

was resolved previously,
E.

of attorneys. The tax

liability

prior t0 the present liquidation efforts.

What Was The Intended Consequence Of The Rule 70(b) Instrument?

VHS

This Magistrate declared the transfers to
Victoria H. Smith’s assets under the year-2008

Victoria t0

to

his cadre

VHS

Properties,

LLC

0n July

4,

Properties,

LLC

an act 0f “gifting” 0f

Power 0f Attorney, being

the transfers

from

2012, and the Magistrate declared such a gifting act

be outside the authority of the Power 0f Attorney; and held them

t0

be invalid. The

Magistrate followed up With the disposition that the year-1990 Holographic Will 0f Victoria H.

Smith was also invalid upon the controversial claim 0f undue inﬂuence. Those rulings were also
upheld 0n appeal.
After those rulings, the Magistrate could simply reverse certain transfers 0f July 4, 2012

and restore ownership

to Decadent, allowing the devolution to

Victoria had died 0n September 11, 2013.

proceed under the UPC, since

The Magistrate, apparently un-aware of the

statutory

declarations, entered her Instrument so as to transfer certain property interests to Hillen,

act served to

make

Hillen claim ownership to Decedent’s property, but,

and

by law, has

authority in the capacity as a Personal Representative, acting in a ﬁduciary capacity, and

by

the terms of the

that

limited

bound

UPC.

That ill-worded and poorly crafted Instrument was contrary t0 the Statute (LC. §15-3101) and the well-established case law,
(1919); Fairchild

v.

Lemp

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 (1984), and Ellmaker

P. 222,

v.

223

Tabor, 160

Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015), ignoring the controlling authority that prohibits any person in a

ﬁduciary capacity to take
t0 satisfy valid

title

to a

Decedent’s property

interests, limited

only to seek possession

and approved claims of a creditor and other interested persons, the authority
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regarding which

is

identiﬁed in detail in Appellant’s Opening Brief and addressed hereinafter in

a supplemental manner.
In open Court in year-2017, during a hearing before the Magistrate

Rule 70(b) Instrument, acknowledged she was not familiar With the law as
matters, though stated

Although

two

this issue

(2)

months

after the Instrument

was

it

Who

crafted that

relates t0 probate

entered.

has been brought to the attention 0f the Magistrate, the scope of that

Instrument has not corrected, and a request t0 d0 so has been denied, leaving this Instrument to

be addressed by
regarding

this

Supreme Court

Decedent’s

property,

as

t0

announce

ownership

its

is

invalidity as to the rights

statutorily

determined,

0f “ownership”

and cannot be

undermined, degraded, 0r disregarded, yet the entry has been mis—used mis-interpreted, misconstrued and abused by Hillen, and

Nowhere

in In re Estate

left t0

ﬂounder by the Magistrate

0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d

court.

6,

(2018), did the Court

disregard the Statute and well-established Idaho law that heirs, not a ﬁduciary,

become

the

vested and titled owners 0f Decedent’s assets, immediately upon death, and nothing within the

Supreme Court Opinion

either

afﬁrmed any placement 0f ownership of the property

interests

With either the estate 0r any personal representative, and nothing was argued, 0r decided that

would

alter the statutory provisions that

placed ownership with the heirs, and the statutory

provisions that allowed the Personal Representative possession 0f the heirs interests only,

during the administration,
exercise the statutory

When

power

the Personal Representative has established a necessity t0

t0 obtain possession,

for the satisfaction

0f creditors 0r other

interested persons. Otherwise ownership remains With the heirs and distributed t0 the heirs

through an in-kind distribution, whenever possible.

Vernon, being a 2/3““ heir of Decedent, retains 2/3rds ownership, as the probate
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is

currently structured. There are n0 creditors.

None of

the heirs are perceived to beneﬁt

Hillen’s desire t0 liquidate assets, as doing such only creates capital gains taxation

by

beyond the

previously stepped-up basis, as there are no creditors t0 address an outstanding interest. If an
heir wants t0 sell an in-kind distributed interest, after closure, then so

be

it,

but that

is

a decision

for the heir, not Hillen. This irrational conduct, depriving an heir 0f real property that

by law

is

declared to be unique by nature, and cannot be replaced, needlessly exposes heirs to capital
gains tax they desire not t0 incur, caused from the liquidation 0f assets that should never be

sold.

Arguably, a breach 0f ﬁduciary duty exists Where the Personal Representative causes

unnecessary taxation to the Estate. Vernon has spent his lifetime preserving and maintaining
these real property assets, they are unique,

and

VKS

III

some having

historical value,

and cannot be replaced,

has been a tremendous assistance With preserving and protecting the

Raymond

St.

property.

F.

Applicable Statutory Authority

And Case Law On Property Ownership

In the absence of any “necessity” arising out of the administration of the Estate for the

beneﬁt of creditors/interested persons,

I.C.

§15-3-71

1,

the Probate

Code

vests

title

and

ownership of Decedent’s property With the heirs or devisees, immediately upon death.

It

remains a well-established and statutorily mandated preference for in-kind distribution among
heirs, as

reminded

opposed

to liquidation

of estate property LC. §15-3-906. Hillen has been repeatedly

his behavior is mis—guided, as there are

knows Vernon resolved

all

sale

property, there remains

0f the Hamer property,

Appellant’s Reply Brief

creditors,

and taxes were satisﬁed. Hillen

debts and liabilities of his Father and

(decades), and once the federal tax issue

Hamer

no

n0 need

now

Mother many years ago

was resolved and paid from

t0 liquidate, as substantial cash

the proceeds from the

remained following the

being churned away with Hillen’s needless and senseless fees
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accruing in these controversial confrontations with Hillen and his cadre of attorneys.
Hillen’s liquidation

is

unnecessary

at best,

spiteful

and malicious

funding for himself and his attorneys, pursuing these matters

at worst, creating

at the rate that typically

exceeds

$30,000.00+ per month, Which wasteful expenditures are borne 2/3““ by Vernon and 1/3“ by
Joseph. This “administrative” disposition

approaching $2 Million, arguably not in any

is

legitimate preservation 0f the Estate, as statutorily owed,

In so liquidating, Hillen

is

by

Hillen.

creating unnecessary capital gains taxes, never the purpose 0f

a ﬁduciary, and not in the best interests 0f any heir, 0r the Estate. These actions taken by Hillen

remain

t0

be in excess of his statutory authority, and should

behavior a breach of his ﬁduciary duty,

it

it

be necessary to claim

this

becomes remediable by an award 0f damages, LC.

§15-3-712, but Hillen chooses t0 perpetuate his exposure t0 damages because 0f this declared

ownership 0f Decedent’s property

G. Established Case

interests

by

the poorly crafted Instrument.

Law Limitations On Personal Representative Ownership

Idaho law, commencing a century ago, has declared a ﬁduciary cannot lawfully be an

“owner” 0f a Decedent’s property, notwithstanding the creation 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument, as
a Personal Representative cannot hold ownership to a decedent’s assets, so declared in

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184
and LC. §15-3-101, as adopted

P. 222,

in

part 0fthe

”
estate,

and

223 (1919). That case remains consistent With the

Idaho in 1971, placing

or heirs. Lemp, unanimously declared

that principle remains the

recently, Ellmaker

cited in Appellant’s

v.

v.

v.

UPC

and ownership with the devisees
is

not the owner 0f any

law today, conﬁrmed by the provisions of the

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147,

676 P.2d 722 (1984), and

Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015), each 0f Which have been

Opening
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title

“The administrator or executor

probate code and Idaho case law, Fairchild

more

Lemp

Briefs.
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created

N0

Magistrate would knowingly and deliberately eliminate any heir’s interest that

by

Statute, as

such intention would be a Violation of I.C. §15-3-101 and remain void and

The Magistrate would be committing a

un-enforceable.

authority exists to eliminate an heir’s

§15-3-101.

N0

is

title

Cannon

Judicial

and vested ownership

Violation,

in decedent’s assets

no

as

under

I.C.

Magistrate would commit such a willful statutory Violation, yet this wrongful

disposition has lingered and remains t0 exist since June 2, 2017, in Violation 0f the Statute, in
Violation of the well-established case law, and the very prohibition that expressly prevents a

Personal Representative from owning estate assets.

H.

What Has Transpired By The Unintended Consequences Of Hillen’s Actions?
Because 0f

this

claim t0 ownership, Hillen has ﬁled four (4) cases in District Court,

seeking t0 eject an heir and others, with n0 necessity for doing so, the ﬁrst Action being also 0n
appeal, Hillen

Action being

v.

Gibson, Fourth Dist,

this case, Hillen

v.

V.

Ada County Case No.

K. Smith

Law Oﬁces 0f

III,

CV

01-19—10368; the second

Ada County Case No.

CV

01-19-10367, the

al.,

Ada County Case N0.

heir, currently

on appeal, and a fourth

Action regarding property that arguably does not constitute Decedent’s

asset, as prior litigation

third Action being Hillen

v.

Vernon K. Smith,

CV01-19-20686, ﬁled and served 0n Vernon, the 2/3““

et.

has given rise to the doctrine of issue and claim preclusion, employing the doctrine of res
judicata the effect 0f Which should control that Action, being, Hillen v Riverside Farms, Ina,

Ada County Case No. CV01-20-06707,

seeking to eject the entity that Farms the Chinden

property t0 preserve the farm exemption and maintain the programs that preserve the soil
conditions and irrigation systems under the ownership of VHS Properties,
In none 0f these Actions does Hillen’s pleadings articulate any

liquidate, just his allegation
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t0

of “ownership” fundamental t0 advance an ejectment Action in

P.

29

District Court, nothing associated With the pre-requisites

heirs’ interest in the property for satisfactions

and Hillen

is

UPC

for possession 0f the

0f creditor claims, as Hillen knows none

exist,

using this the unorthodox crafted 70(b) Instrument to advance his “exclusive

ownership” claim t0 the
It

under the

was thought

heirs’ property to

meet the

criterial

element of an ejectment Action.

was placed With

the subject 0f this probate matter

titled

the Magistrate Court,

yet Hillen proceeds to District Court, and the Magistrate appears unconcerned With that process
that invades the probate jurisdiction.

Can

a District Court exercise jurisdiction over a probate

controversy Where the Personal Representative pursues an ejectment claim that impacts the
heir’s

ownership

Does

interest in

an estate?

the case law preclude a Personal Representative from claiming ownership 0f a

Decedent’s assets, and declare that n0 part 0f the estate
supra)?

Can

is

owned by

the ﬁduciary

(i.e.

Lemp,

a Personal Representative avoid the requirement of necessity that must be

established in probate Court before effectuating the right t0 obtain possession 0f property from

an heir? Are there requirements built into the

UPC

that preclude

any attempt

to liquidate the

heirs’ assets?

Hillen sought to avoid “necessity”

by

the improper use of the Instrument t0 claim his

“ownership” theory to avoid compliance with the limitations established in the UPC. Hillen
chose the District Court forums as he

knew he was up

against the necessity requirement if he

remained in the probate Court, and his behavior would be vehemently challenged, s0 he wanted
t0 speciﬁcally avoid

having to prove the existence of necessity, though having before received

the right t0 sell the property

on the minimum ﬂoor price established by the

Hillen could not reach, but decided t0

instead

sell for less

went the avenue of claiming “exclusive
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titled

heirs, a

without consent from the 2/3““

ﬂooring
heir.

He

ownership” with the dubious Rule 70(b)

Instrument, avoiding the required statutory route to seek possession under the Statute.

The

distinctions that arise out 0f the statutory limitations placed

upon

the exercise 0f a

“power”, as exercised by a Personal Representative, in contrast to Hillen’s claim as “sole

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, are manifestly signiﬁcant
exercised

by

he

is

be

the Personal Representative.

If Hillen

heirs,

in determining the authority t0

were the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

n0 longer subject

t0 his trust obligation to heirs,

t0 the exclusion

0f the statutory

nor subject t0 heirs’ corresponding

statutory authority to restrain un-authorized Actions (I.C. §15-3-607),

and seek damages for

breach of ﬁduciary duty (LC. §15-3-712). Hillen was acting upon that potential immunity.
This Court must weigh seriously the fact that If Hillen were the “sole owner” 0f

Decedent’s property, the heirs’
restrain Hillen or recover

trust interest

damages

for breach

obligations should not be eliminated

scope of his statutory authority.
right

and claims
Hillen

t0 assert the

fails t0

has been extinguished, and no longer standing to

by

of ﬁduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory

the un-authorized actions of Hillen, acting outside the

Thus, this Court must correct the error and preserve an heir’s

ﬁduciary breaches occurring in these proceedings.

embrace the statutory distinction between “ownership” and the statutory

necessity required before authorized to take “possession” of any assets, a distinction that

is

highly signiﬁcant t0 the fate of the assets, and Hillen’s quest has been to liquidate assets, (his

Chapter 7 Trustee mentality, his only experience) a resulting consequence
gains tax imposed

assets

owned by

upon the owners 0f the property by

is

to create a capital

the reckless acts of liquidation of these

the heirs. Neither the Statute nor Idaho case law support Hillen’s liquidation

quest 0r claim to ownership.

Signiﬁcant distinctions arise out of statutory limitations placed upon exercise of a
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“power” by a Personal Representative, opposed

to Hillen’s claim t0

be the sole “owner” 0f

Decedent’s property. Hillen cannot be deemed the “sole owner”, t0 the exclusion 0f Decedent’s
heirs, as

he has a statutory

trust obligation t0 heirs,

right to restrain his un-authorized Actions (LC.

damages

§15-3-607), and statutory right t0 recover

not only un-founded in law, but an un-intended consequence

is

the formation of the Magistrate’s un—intended error

I.

to heirs’ statutory

for Hillen’s breach 0f ﬁduciary duty (LC. §15-3-712).

This behavior of Hillen

by

and must remain subject

Statutory Limitations

review under

if there

were

UPC provisions

only seek a grant to possession, in

and

in such a situation, his actions

trust, for

the

remain subject to

as Cited above.2

to

be served by the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Instrument was

voidance 0f certain transfers 0f assets t0

Who

may

creditors,

The only intended function

to Decedent,

the poorly crafted 70(b) Instrument.

On Hillen’s Probate Authority

In contrast t0 ownership, Hillen

beneﬁt of creditors,

by

VHS

Properties,

LLC

and return those speciﬁc assets

then being deceased, could only statutorily vest in the heirs or devisees, never

a personal representative 0f any estate. Notwithstanding the magistrate’s all-encompassing

language Within the Rule 70(b) Instrument, the effect can neither exceed, nor expand the limited
scope of the statutory power and authority that has been statutorily granted (and limited) t0 a
personal representative in the administration 0f an estate, as provided by I.C. § 15-3-701 et seq.

and

I.C.

§15-3-901

The
that

2

he

is

et seq..

disaster occurring

from Hillen’s expressly-stated objective

t0 liquidate the assets, is

defeating the heirs’ interests, as though his authority under the

upon

UPC

his claim t0 “ownership” 0f Decedent’s property, not

is

no

different

mere “possession.” In a
and the remedies and restrictions they provide and
address the concern over the un-authon'zed actions of a Personal Representative Which is at the center 0f Hillen’s mis—conduct,
fueled by the Magistrate’s erroneous Rule 70(b) Instrument.
Hillen’s claim in these cases has been based

larger sense,

it is

the very application of the
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than his limited experience as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, his professional background.

upon

Hillen’s actions in the district court are predicated solely

property, excluding the heirs’ statutory ownership, not

for

any speciﬁed purpose necessitated

creditors, but

upon

upon any

in the administration

his un-warranted idea

seen to be a breach of his duty under the

he can liquidate

UPC,

“ownership” 0f Decedent’s

statutory right t0 “possession”

0f the Estate for the beneﬁt 0f

assets, regardless

0f need, Which

is

as Hillen has declared the intention to liquidate

the heirs interests, a direct contravention to the express standards requiring the preservation 0f
estate properly

under

I.C.

§15-3-906,

and in—kind distribution

UPC

and case law

any probated Will, 0r

is

precise: “Estates

t0 heirs if

n0 Will

is

descend

at

and

this

gross

Idaho law, heirs obtain and retain

death t0 successors identiﬁed by

probated, subject t0 limitations which

implemented through administration.” Ofﬁcial Comment LC.

By

heirs,

must be corrected.

contradiction 0f law and statutory limitations

The

t0

title,

Personal Representative that has a factual basis to

§

15—3-101,

11

may be

1).

subject to divestment and possession

show

by

the

necessity for the exercise of the LC.

§15-3-711 power, limited by a required necessity for the administration 0f the Estate for the

beneﬁt 0f creditors 0r other interested parties. What Hillen
ﬁling these four (4) District Court proceedings

mandate, and in
provided), and

its

place, claim

by doing

title

is

to by-pass

is

attempting t0 accomplish by his

and disregard the existing statutory

t0 decedent’s property (instead

of the

heirs, as statutorily

as he wants at his sole discretion, believing he can escape liability if

acting as an “owner”.

If Hillen is

then does

it

n0 longer required

t0 act

under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power,

follow that Hillen n0 longer has any ﬁduciary duty t0 the heirs by What he

engaging, and does Hillen n0 longer have any duty t0 protect assets, and
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is it

is

then that neither

Vernon, nor Joseph could challenge Hillen’s Actions, as Hillen’s

liability

may

then be

extinguished by the unintended consequence 0f the mis—use 0f the poorly crafted 70(b)

Instrument? This could never have been the intention of the Magistrate, the legislature, the
courts 0r the well-established history of probate law before the adoption 0f the

such
its

J.

is

UPC.

as t0 allow

without statutory authority, in Violation 0f case law, beyond the Magistrate’s exercise 0f

jurisdiction,

and a breach 0f the ﬁduciary duty Hillen

A

is

bound by law

t0 uphold.

A

Rule 70(b) Instrument, T0 Defeat An
Probate Court Had N0 Authority, By Use Of
Heir’s Ownership Interest In Decedent’s Property, Obtained As
Matter Of Law Under

A

I.C. §15-3-101

Though

the Idaho

Supreme Court’s Opinion was not

invited t0 address or decide any

question concerning the construction and application 0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument, the language

0f that Order — on

face

its

— cannot be construed

to support Hillen’s contentions that

it

conferred

ownership t0 Decedent’s property, as the Magistrate was seeking only t0 restore
Decedent, (though even then arguably was pursued in Violation 0f statutory
process requirements, and lack 0f in-personum jurisdiction over those from
actually taken). Prior t0 the death of Victoria H. Smith, her interests

Properties,

LLC, never

title

restraints,

whom

due

was

title

were placed With

t0

VHS

a party to any probate proceeding 0r any appeal, and that transfer

was

speciﬁcally undertaken pursuant to Victoria’s direct wishes and instructions in 2012.

The

“transfer” to Hillen,

as conditioned

upon what was

n0 matter how construed, could not exceed

stated to

be Hillen’s capacity “as personal representative 0f the

Estate.” This conditional reference must

conﬁrm

that Hillen can only

possession 0f property, only upon and in the course 0f
the provisions of the

3

UPC

is

be authorized t0 take

exercise 0f a “power” consistent with

concerning the authority and powers 0f a Personal Representative.3

it corresponds to the IRCP Rule 70. The last sentence of Rule 821 addresses issuance of an order for
of “possession,” as opposed t0 Rule 70’s singular focus transfer 0f “title.” (“When any entry is for the delivery of

Within IRFLP Rule 821

transfer

his limited authority
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A
by

the

Personal Representative administering an estate

UPC. The Ofﬁcial Comment

t0

is

bound by

the limitations

imposed

LC. §15-3-703 notes statutory constraints upon

their

actions, declaring that:

is derived from appointment by the public
But the Code also makes it clear the personal

[A] personal representative’s authority

agency known

as the Court.

representative, in spite 0f the source 0f his authority,

t0

is

proceed With the

by use of statutory powers
and in accordance With statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704.
administration, settlement and distribution of the estate

.

Hillen has been

claiming t0 be the “exclusive
statutorily—conferred

Of concern,
0f the Document,
“individually,

,9

‘6

it

title

beyond

acting

to

titled

statutorily-conferred

his

by erroneously

authority

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, divesting the

which they have been bestowed immediately upon

.

heirs 0f all

death.

within the language expressed within the Rule 70(b) Instrument, on Page (2)
references the scope 0f divestment extending t0

as personal representative,

“any other capacity.”

Upon What

,9

‘6
,

Vernon K. Smith’s

capacity,

as attorney—in—fact 0r agent or ﬁduciary,”

and

authority does a Magistrate divest an heir of his statutorily

decreed ownership 0f Decedent’s assets? The use of this all-encompassing “divestment”

language raises concern as t0 the Magistrate’s awareness 0f the
deliberate intent to eliminate

Vernon K. Smith’s

contradiction 0f LC. §15-3-101?

It

UPC,

or

was

it

statutory interest as an “intestate” heir, in

has been the “preferred” belief

it

has been the Magistrate’s

un—familiar background with probate matters and her un-awareness 0f the law?

had n0 statutory

authority,

n0 power, no

Intestate heir statutorily vested

If this Appellate

possession, the party in

under

I.C.

whose favor

it is

entered

is

The Magistrate

jurisdictional basis to eliminate the interest of an

§15-3-101.

Court continues the perpetuation of

Although the IRFLP has no application here,

the Magistrate’s

entitled t0 a writ

conﬁrms a known

this

artiﬁcial

and un—lawful

0f execution or assistance upon application t0 the clerk”).

between “possession” and “title” that has been
recognized in the rules. Even in the absence of corresponding “possession” language in Rule 70, in this matter the Rule 70(b)
entry must be construed as a re-vestment of title to the heirs — not to Hillen—to exercise only a “power” over the property as
statutorily authorized,

LC. §15-3 -71
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ownership being vested within Hillen, claiming a divestiture 0f the heir’s statutorily held
interests,

then each Intestate heir has been denied their statutory property rights Without due

process 0f law, and the Rule 70(b) Instrument must be declared void, as a matter of law.

Neither the law, nor any good-faith objective of the Rule 70(b) Instrument would permit

such an un-intended consequence. Hillen’s un-authorized premise of sole ownership operates to
eliminate

all

statutory ownership interests.4

It is

impossible for any judicial ofﬁcer to eliminate

an heir’s vested interest Without statutory authority allowing such an actions Such an outcome
constitutes an absurd

would not be

and actionable

result, as the

Magistrate irrationally creating that absurdity

acting in a judicial capacity, the fundamental and essential factor for the grant 0f

judicial immunity.

By

analogy t0 the rules of contract construction, used in the interpretation 0f

Court Orders, n0 effect should be given t0 a Court Order that creates an absurd
v.

result.

Schieche

Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).

The conduct of a Court

acting in excess 0f statutorily-conferred authority has been

addressed in Appellant’s Opening Brief, wherein State

731

(Ct.

App. 2008), was

cited,

v.

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d

and the Armstrong Court addressed the issue succinctly as

follows:

[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction

mean simply

when

they

committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply With governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred t0 a lack 0f “jurisdiction” when perhaps more precisely meaning that a
motion or complaint was not timely ﬁled, that a condition precedent t0 the right to
ﬁle the action was not satisﬁed, 0r that governing statutes 0r court rules did
not authorize the particular decision made bv the court. (citations omitted)
146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and parenthetical
really

that the court

4

As identiﬁed previously, Vernon’s sister, Victoria Ann Converse, assigned her 1/3rd intestate t0 Vernon, such that Vernon holds
2/3““ ownership 0f the assets and Joseph has a 1/3‘d interest under the cuITent state of the proceedings. If the Rule 70(b) entry is
construed to eliminate Vernon’s intestate share, then as the remaining intestate heir, neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by
court order, would become the sole heir of the estate, a most absurd result never intended, assuming the magistrate adheres to the

Cannon of Judicial Conduct.
5
The “Slayer’s Act,” as codiﬁed
of an intestate heir’s interest in an

Appellant’s Reply Brief

at I.C.
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reference t0 “citations omitted,” added).

As Appellant addressed
decision announced in People

Rptr.

v.

previously, Armstrong cited t0 California’s

Supreme Court

American Contractors Indemnity C0,, 33 Ca1.4th 653, 16

3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004), wherein the proposition was adopted

Cal.

that a court, acting

contrary t0 authority conferred by statute, has acted in excess 0f its iurisdiction. 146 Idaho at
376, 195 P.3d at 735.

Our Supreme

As

such, this Rule 70(b) Instrument

Court, in State

v.

must be held to be void.

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3

(201 1) has expressly acknowledged the rationale announced in Armstrong

— Where

the Court 0f

Appeals differentiated between jurisdiction and authority, announced in Armstrong.6

have authoritatively cited

t0

Armstrong,

Hartwig, as demonstrated in State
2014), and State

It

subsequent t0 the Supreme Court’s decision in

Vaughn, 156 Idaho

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

580

n.2,

13, 15,

319 P.3d 497, 499

288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2

(Ct.

(Ct.

App.

App. 2012).

remains t0 be neither rational nor judicially prudent for a Magistrate t0 allow Hillen t0

carry into effect

interest

v.

v.

Courts

he

is

what Hillen has construed and advocated

to

be his “ownership” of property

precluded from owning, given the prohibition announced in

Lemp

v.

Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919), declaring “The administrator or executor

owner 0f any part 0f the

estate,

Lemp, 32
is

not the

and the pre-emptive statutory vesture of exclusive ownership

with the Decedent’s heir(s) immediately upon death 0f the Decedent.

No

Magistrate, acting With a judicious objective, and acting in the capacity as a judge,

exercising thoughtful jurisprudence,

mandated devolution 0f ownership
code, vesting interests t0

6

Until superseded

would engage

interests

an intentional Violation of the statutory

of Decedent’s property required under the probate

someone other than mandated within the

by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court,

Appeals are binding precedent upon lower Idaho

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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courts. State
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and

upon the same question, opinions of the Idaho Court of
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665—66 (1992).

as issued
v.

Statute, expressly

exclusively t0 the heirs.

N0

Magistrate

is

allowed to deliberately defy the statutory mandates 0f

property ownership, as t0 do so exceeds a Magistrate’s jurisdictional authority.
Hillen’s persistent claim he has

become

the sole

owner 0f Decedent’s property

interests,

defying the statutory delegation of such interests, coupled With a Magistrate’s failure to preserve
the statutory integrity

mandated by the UPC,

is

both disturbing and disappointing, as

perpetuates an illogical use and an aberration in what

was

to

it

be the intended objective and

construction 0f this procedural Instrument (Rule 70(b)), absurdly fostering a mis-placed use 0f

an Instrument t0 maliciously exceed the authority 0f a Personal Representative, and the mis—use
0f the jurisdiction and authority 0f the Magistrate, void of any statutory or jurisdictional basis
for the Magistrate’s act, serving to allow Hillen t0 use a

document

t0 serve a disingenuous

and

wrongful purpose—a tool wrongfully used t0 needlessly and senselessly engage the liquidation

of the

heirs’ property,

actions

inconsistent

are

contemplated

When

is fast

With

the

mandated in-kind

distribution

enacting these governing probate proceedings

Uniform Probate Code
paying What

churning more irrational and unnecessary attorney fees, as Hillen’s

in year-1971, yet

we

the

Idaho

Legislature

upon adopting of

the

see an Estate that has n0 creditors, exposed to

approaching $2 million in attorney fees and expenses t0 Hillen and his cadre

of attorneys, a very frustrating event experienced by these

heirs;

and a primary example of why

Victoria H. Smith engaged in the behaviors she did t0 bequeath her worldly possessions t0

Vernon.
Hillen’s mis—guided behavior, and the Magistrate’s reluctance to correct this gross error,

has perpetuated a destructive course 0f action by Hillen, and this Appellate Court must protect

and enforce the purpose and

integrity

0f the statutory authority and devolution 0f property

ownership, and prevent such behavior that damages heirs, and needlessly creates justiﬁable
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claims for breach 0f Hillen’s ﬁduciary duties and responsibilities t0 protect and preserve the
successor interests of the heirs about which he has taken an oath to uphold and enforce the
limitations of his authority.

K.

The Rule 70(b) Instrument, Construed By Hillen T0 Transfer “OWNERSHIP” Of
Decedent’s Property T0 Him, Was Never Placed At Issue Or Decided Upon The Appeal
Of The Holographic Will And Power Of Attorney
Appellant has addressed this in the Opening Brief, but considering the persistent

construction Hillen continues to place

reign Hillen

right

in, this

conﬁrmed by

432 P.3d

6,

upon

this

Rule 70(b) entry, and the Magistrate’s

failure t0

mis—guided proposition that Hillen pursues has never been an ownership

this Court’s

Decision in the Matter ofEstate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466,

15 (2018). His perception that

engage in any disposition

t0

conﬁrm

it

does invites further response, as this Court did not

Hillen’s ownership 0f Decedent’s property interests, as this

Court never embraced Hillen’s argument of his claimed ownership, and there

is

n0 support

within any Appellate Court precedent, as his position violates well-established case law, and
contradicts the statutory

As
issues,

scheme of ownership formulated Within the Uniform Probate Code.

before stated, the bifurcated appeal taken t0 the Supreme Court addressed only two

Which were presented

t0,

and were

be decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in the

t0

Matter ofEstate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d
(1)

Did the probate court

Smith invalid due
4,

2012

t0

err in

ﬁnding the February

undue inﬂuence? and

(2)

Did

14,

6,

15 (2018). Those two issues were:

1990 Holographic Will 0f Victoria H.

the probate Court err in setting aside the July

transfers of Victoria H. Smith’s property interests to the

power of attorney used did not speciﬁcally authorize

gifting?

On

LLC, upon

the

ﬁnding the

both questions the Supreme

Court afﬁrmed the decision 0f the Magistrate, ﬁnding no merit t0 address 0r embrace Hillen’s
claim to hold the ownership of Decedent’s property that

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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is titled

t0 the heirs.

Once

the disposition

was made

to set aside the transfers,

property would be returned to Decedent, and t0 then

Virtue 0f that act, the

by

become properly

transferred thereafter

pursuant to the statutory devolution established by the legislative enactment Within the Uniform

N0

Probate Code.

one thought the statutory scheme mandated by the Statute would encounter an

Instrument that would cause a head-on collision between the provisions 0f the

conceived procedural transfer from a voided transaction.

on

that appeal construing the

had taken n0

its

action,

meaning 0r use by Hillen

and Hillen was not a party

issues affecting his appointment 0r his behavior. There

was n0 erroneous

time, as there

i11-

raised or decided

t0 establish a ripe

in the

issue for

appeal, as there were n0

was n0 envisioned controversy

at the

application as t0 the consequential effect 0f the Instrument that

restored ownership to Decedent, as

heirs, not

was being

issue

and an

purpose 0r intent of the Rule 70(b) Instrument, as there was no

controversy then in existence as t0
appeal, as Hillen

N0

UPC

it

was

clear the ownership, as a matter of law, vested in the

t0 suggest

he was

one envisioned such a mis—application would be pursued in Violation 0f the

Statute.

any Personal Representative, and Hillen had taken n0 action

planning any nefarious conduct.

N0
The

return of the property to the Decedent’s heirs

the provisions of the

UPC,

unfortunately not reined in

On

the

was declared

despite

by

Supreme Court

to

what

is

was perceived

to

be exclusively governed by

being maliciously contended by Hillen currently, and

the Magistrate.

appeal,

n0 issues were raised or decided

t0 the effect that Hillen

be the sole “owner” 0f Decedent’s property, as opposed

to a statutory

acquire possession, in

trust, solely for

the beneﬁt of Estate’s heirs, as provided

none 0f which

Nor was

made

for

existed.

Hillen

a party t0 the appeal, so that issue

any decision. The “divestment” language reﬂected
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in the

by

power
the

t0

UPC,

was never

ripe

Rule 70(b) Instrument was

“understood” to accomplish re-instatement 0f Victoria’s ownership in certain assets, from which
the

UPC

would proceed With

the devolution, as Victoria

2013) When the Rule 70(b) Instrument was entered June

was no determination by

the

Supreme Court

statutory interest in Decedent’s property,

101, and there

to

the

UPC

was no

2,

was then deceased (September
2017, almost four years

statutorily vesting

disposition that as a result 0f any such entry, Hillen

constraints,

as

Representative; 0r that Hillen

imposed by the

was

free to

UPC

There

Decedent were divested 0f

heirs 0f the

Where there was

later.

upon

Hillen’s

under

as

their

I.C. § 15-3-

was n0 longer

actions

11,

subject

a Personal

proceed With unfettered liquidation 0f the heir’s

vested property interests, Without reference to any necessity for liquidation of that property to
address a creditors’ interest in the administration of the Estate, as none existed.

This court expressed one statement within the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation 0f the
factual and procedural background 0f that appeal wherein the Court’s single reference t0 the

Rule 70(b) Instrument

is

the following:

In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule 0f Civil
Procedure 70(b), Which vested title to all 0f Victoria’s real and personal property
in the personal representative

who had been

appointed.

Vernon appealed these

decisions, and this Court granted Joseph’s motion
0f appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant t0 Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the
appeal t0 ﬁrst address anv matters occurring up t0 and including the posttrial iudgment under Rule 70(b) before considering anv matters occurring
thereafter. The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent
Noah Hillen, is not participating in this portion 0f the appeal. 164 Idaho at
466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).
for acceptance

Hillen construes this single statement to

assets, not the heirs as statutorily delegated

the

commentary

Decedent’ s

interests.

P.

t0

be the sole owner 0f Decedent’s

and mandated by case law, apparently construing

t0 default into a “divestment”
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of the heir’s statutory devolution of ownership 0f

N0

such issue 0f Hillen’s claimed ownership was raised, 0r What effect to be given the

magistrate’s efforts at ownership restoration, and

now

With the issue becoming ripe With the

mis-application from the intended act of that restoration,

it

can be addressed here, challenging

when no such

was decided by

Hillen’s un-founded reliance

upon

Supreme Court

0f the Rule 70(b) Instrument transferring ownership 0f Decedent’s

t0

any

effect

heirs’ property interests t0

the 70(b) Instrument,

become vested

in

any manner contrary

own

with a Personal Representative that cannot

issue

to the

the

mandates 0f the Statute

a Decedent’s property by Virtue of Lemp, supra.

There was n0 issue developed 0r ripe for any adjudication on that appeal concerning the
interpretation,

determination 0f

UPC. The only

the Decedent’s property, as ownership

title t0

issues

enforcement of the 70(b) Instrument on the question 0f any

or

effect,

were the Will and

the validity of the Will,

it

transfers t0 the

remained un—certain whether

which case Vernon was the

sole devisee

and remain subject

exclusively controlled

LLC, and
this

was

until the appeal

t0

by

the

determined

be a Testate probate, in

and the designated Personal Representative under

Victoria’s Holographic Will, or an Intestate probate, in

heirs

is

Which case Vernon was among several

t0 Hillen’s appointment.7

Hillen cannot construe the Court’s statement as being anything other than mere obiter

dictum, as was addressed in Smith

(Bistline,

J,

v.

Angeli, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992)

concurring in the reversal 0f the judgment below and the remand for further

proceedings) (“‘[A] remark by the wayg’ that

is,

an observation 0r remark made by a judge in

pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some

rule, principle, or application

0f law, or

7

The Rule 70(b) Instrument was entered for the purpose 0f restoring Decedent’s prior ownership, not alter the
scheme 0f ownership by unlawfully conveying ownership t0 a Personal Representative. The Idaho
Supreme Court neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other than the 2012 transfers 0f Decedent’s property t0 a
limited liability company, and the validity 0f the Decedent’s Holographic Will. The Supreme Court’s reference t0
the Rule 70(b) entry provided a demarcation in the estate process 0f the bifurcation 0f What was an issue 0n appeal,
deﬁning those two issues on appeal, Which encompassed the time period in the scope of the bifurcated appeal. The
statutory

appeal followed the parties’ stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to address only the Will and validity of the transfers to
the

LLC, before considering

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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the solution 0f a question suggested

0r essential to

its

determination;

.

.

by the case

but not necessarily involved in the case

at bar,

.”).

Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation 0f Idaho appellate decisions
differentiating

between issues actually raised and issues actually decided by the Court, and

matters simply referred t0 Within the recitation 0f the case Within the decision. Bashore

41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925), (“There

what

is

said in an opinion and what

is

decided by

C.J.,

Adolf,

a pronounced line of demarcation between

is

it.”

(citation omitted; italicized

added». See Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity

850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993), (McDeVitt,

v.

v.

emphasis

Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586,

concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal C0.

v.

Idaho Farms C0., 6O Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45
Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927). This line 0f authority has a long-established history and

would mandate application 0f the Doctrine of Stare Decisis.
This principle 0f interpretation, as applied t0 Idaho appellate Opinions, and as based

upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision
by Idaho’s U.S.

District

Court

in,

AMXIntem.,

in the light

Hash

Inc.

v.

v.

Adolf, supra, has recently been applied

Battelle

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d

U.S.,

454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D. Idaho 2006)

itself has stated that its

opinions “must be considered and construed

1087, 1091-92 (D. Idaho 2010); and

(“The Idaho Supreme Court

Bashore

in

v.

0f the rule that they are authoritative only 0n the facts 0n which they are founded.

General expressions must be taken in connection With the case in Which those expressions are
used.

Hillen’s perceived construction of the Idaho

conﬁrmed

Supreme Court’s

his ownership, is inconsistent With not only the provisions

decision, claiming

0f the

UPC

(a right

it

0f

possession and “power” for the satisfaction of creditor claims and other interested persons), but
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remains expressly prohibited by the holding as to ownership mandated by the Statute, and the
prohibition announced in

Lemp

administrator or executor

is

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

v.

P. 222,

223 (1919), (“The

not the owner 0f any part 0f the estate.8 The principle expressed

within that case remains undisturbed authority in Idaho, With no negative treatment 0f that

authority,

conﬁrmed by Casemaker

decisions, In

Re MacDonnell ’S

4.

Lemp

Estate, 56

Nev

67 Idaho 294, 178 P.2d 382 (1947), Vaught
Caldwell

v.

has been subsequently cited Within four appellate

v.

346, 53 P.2d 625, (1936);

Malone

we

trust Will

Van Etten,

259 (1941); and

Struble, 62 Idaho 352, 120 P.2d

Thiessen, 50 Idaho 515, 92 P.2d 1047 (1939), and

v.

soon to be cited in

this appellate disposition.

Court judgments, judicial and administrative decrees, are subject t0 the same rules of
interpretation as the construction 0f contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190

P.3d 925, 928 (2008); City ofPocatello v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188
(2017).

A prominent rule

eXisting law.

Path

of contract interpretation

LLP

t0 Health,

(“‘This Court has held that “it

every written

contract.

,9”,

interpretation in Application

(“What the court

is

213 (1946) (noting

.

.

that

.

.”);

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)

This

omitted).

is

rule

made

written into and

a part 0f

was expressly applied

to

the

0f Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949),

and

must be taken
in,

in connection With the statutes as they then

In re Anderton’s Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212,

an executor must act “in

The adoption of the provisions 0f the

8

they are interpreted in regard t0 the then-

axiomatic that extant law

(citations

said, therefore,

existed and applied,

v.

is

strict

UPC in

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code,

compliance with the law

.

.

.

.”).

1971, in effect at the time of the referenced

this principle

0f law has not been altered by Idaho’s 1971

adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, and in fact has been embraced by and effectuated by the mandated transference of
Decedent’s interests immediately to the heirs or devisees upon death, and not to any appointed ﬁduciary by the effects of I.C.§ 153—101.
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appeal in Matter 0f Estate 0f Smith, supra,

was decided

0f law, incorporated within and

the Rule 70(1)) Entry as well as any

Supreme Court’s opinion then on

in

The Rule 70(b) Instrument can only be
provisions, not in contradiction 0f

as a matter

made regarding

applies t0 any interpretation t0 be
interpretation of what

is,

it,

interpreted

and applied consistent with the

administration 0f the estate for the beneﬁt ofcreditors

1.

UPC

which confer upon a Personal Representative only a

“power”, not ownership, allowing a right to “possession” only

71

appeal.

When necessary for

and other interestedpersons.

I.C.

the

§15-3-

Hillen never alleged a need under I.C. §15-3-711 Within the pleadings 0f this ejectment

Action, as Hillen

knew no such need

He

existed.

alleged ownership, going outside the probate

Court’s jurisdiction t0 avoid a determination as t0 the application 0f the provisions 0f the

and the exclusive property ownership
(in the

interests

Gibson matter) for substantially
Hillen’s argument the Idaho

property

is

UPC

0f the heirs in the property Hillen sought t0

less than the

ﬂooring

set

with the

Supreme Court should conﬁrm

specious, and Hillen cannot be allowed to

roam

free

his

sell

heirs.

ownership 0f Decedent’s

and footloose with the heirs

property interests and g0 about liquidating unique property holdings in contradiction 0f the
restrictions placed

upon

his ﬁduciary responsibilities,

and

his disregard for this limited authority

he has within which t0 exercise his responsibilities, and to exceed that authority

is

actionable,

and supports a claim for damages. Hillen’s perception and unruly behavior must be summarily
rejected,

and the Rule 70(b) Instrument deﬁned not

t0 Violate the

UPC

and the statutory

devolution of property ownership and the mandates of the case law.

L. There

Can Be N0 Enforcement Of A Void Instrument

Signiﬁcant constitutional issues arise
party are

impugned and

Appellant’s Reply Brief
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statutory authority

and inpersonum

jurisdiction, 0r the

power

as an inferior Court t0

d0 What has been done by the expressed, yet

un-authorized language used in the Rule 70(b) Instrument. The Magistrate
the statutory provisions Within the

UPC

is

either u_n—aware

on ownership of Decedent’s property

0f

interests, or the

Magistrate knowingly engaged in a statutory Violation and a wrongful taking 0f property, in
Violation of the due process requirements under the United States and Idaho Constitutions,

rendering the Instrument void as a matter of law.

Property interests cannot simply be taken by a Court in Violation of due process.
Investments, Inc.

v.

City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004).

a void Order or Judgment

is

characterized as a taking in Violation of the 14th

United States Constitution. Seaboard Air Line Ry. C0.
1921).

Any

act

upon

Amendment to

the

Fowler, 275 F. 239, 240 (W.D.N.C.,

continued enforcement 0f a “void” Instrument constitutes a “taking” 0f property

interests, speciﬁcally

n0

v.

Any

BHA

offending the statutorily vested interests 0f an heir 0f a Decedent. There

jurisdictional basis behind the irrational usage 0f the

Amendment Violations,

is

Yet Hillen seeks

5th

and

14th

not the background 0f an enforceable Judicial decree.

to act

upon

this statutorily un-authorized, constitutionally defective,

and jurisdictionally void Rule 70(b) Instrument. This can only be Viewed
mal-feasance, as Hillen

now

Rule 70(b) Instrument, as

attempted by Hillen to be applied. The lack of due process, combined with the

is

is

as a

knowing

act

of

an attorney, accepted the appointment t0 serve as a Personal

Representative under the restrictions and limitations formulated Within the

UPC, and took an

oath t0 perform a statutory responsibility within the conﬁnes 0f the Uniform Probate Code, and
not act as a Chapter 7 Trustee.

While the defects remain 0f concern,
98

S. Ct.

as declared in

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley
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v.

Stump

v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

Fisher 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646

(1871), and Sierra Life Ins. C0.

v.

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978),

Appellant and his counsel would focus their preference t0 correct this un-intended consequence

of the erroneous mechanism used by the Magistrate to restore certain property ownership of the
deceased, and operate within the requirements 0f the

UPC. The

continuing disregard for the

statutory limitations affecting vested interests 0f heirs serves to perpetuate needless

the heirs and the disrupted interests of the third-parties

activity,

and

this

damaged by

damages

to

Hillen’s un-authorized

Court has the inherent authority to identify What was the limited purpose 0f the

Rule 70(b) Instrument in

this

probate proceeding. The entry cannot alter the statutory vestiture

0f property ownership emanating from the demise of the Decedent t0 someone

who

cannot

own

any part of a Decedent’s property. This Court must declare Hillen’s ﬂawed and mis—placed
interpretation, t0

be a void and un-constitutional interpretation 0f an ownership

In Sierra Life Ins. C0.

court declared the effects

v.

restoration.

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978), the

when there

is

lack of personal jurisdiction and due process, and here a

lack of statutory authority, stating:

Furthermore, because of the serious ramiﬁcations and consequences which could
follow from a court acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we
recognize that it is important t0 keep that concept clearly deﬁned. For example,
the defense 0f lack 0f iurisdiction over the subiect matter is never waived
(LR.C.P. 12(h)); purported iudgments entered bv a court without iurisdiction
over the subiect matter are void and as such are subiect t0 collateral attack,
and are not entitled t0 recognition in other states under the full faith and credit
clause 0f the United States Constitution (Restatement 0f Judgments, § 7
In addition, judges who act without jurisdiction over the
(19422.
subject matter may be liable for damages in civil actions. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871).

The

authority that requires relief from void Instruments

under the law. See McClure Engineering, Ina,
P.3d 1189, 1192

(Ct.
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not a discretionary principle

Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155

A void judgment

P.

is

can be attacked

at

any time by any person

adversely affected by

Docket No. 38493.
affected

by

it.

it.

A

Burns

v.

Cuevas

v.

Barraza, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012), Idaho Supreme Court

void judgment can be attacked

at

any time by any person adversely

Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court

narrowly construe[s] what constitutes a void judgment." Hartman
Cas.

United Heritage Prop.

&

Ca, 141 Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005).

The concept 0f a void Instrument was addressed
v.

v.

"

in

Jim

& Maryann Plane Family

Trust

157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015), referring t0 lack 0f personal

Skinner,

jurisdiction,

subject matter jurisdiction, and Violation 0f due process. These jurisdictional

mandated

defects are present in this Rule 70(b) entry, as the Instrument violates the statutorily

devolution 0f a Decedent’s property, and the Magistrate has no jurisdictional authority to divest

an

heir,

Which ownership cannot be defeated by an un-constitutional and

defective Rule 70(b) Instrument

authority.

by a Magistrate

The Supreme Court only ruled upon

that exceeds both its

the transfers of year—2012

jurisdictionally

power and

made under

statutory

the

Power

of Attorney, (declared invalid for lack of gifting authority), but the Court never ruled upon the
effect

0f the language Within the Magistrates 70(b) Instrument.
Hillen cannot be allowed t0 deprive heirs 0f their statutory property rights, and the law

does not support the use being

made of

the

shortcoming, as ownership in an ejectment Action

cannot be

made

cannot meet the

the “exclusive

criteria t0

70(b)

is

Instrument.

Hillen must sense this

fundamental to such an Action. If Hillen

owner” of Decedent’s property by the 70(b) Instrument, he

support an ejectment Action, forcing Hillen to proceed within the

probate Court t0 establish “necessity” t0 take possession, which he will not seek t0 undertake in
this case, as there

disrupt

VKS

III’s

were n0 creditor claims

t0 require a liquidation.

There has been n0 basis t0

14-years of crucial beneﬁt to the property, for Which the heirs have beneﬁted
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since their statutorily vested ownership.

Appellant seeks to mitigate damages and function Within Vernon’s 2/3““ ownership
interest as

an heir of Victoria’s

There
there

is

is

no

VKS III has been a tremendous beneﬁt to the property.

assets, as

legal basis for the ejectment 0f “an

n0 consent from the

exclusive titled ownership

heirs,

and

that concept

un—wanted party from Estate property”,

was never alleged 0r argued;

asserted in Hillen’s Complaint,

ejectment Action, as conﬁrmed by Ada County

knowing

Highway Dist.

v.

that

element

it

has only been

is critical

Total Success Investments,

145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), Where proof 0f ownership,

is

if

to

any

LLC,

foundational to achieve

standing. Hillen structured his foundational requirement through this ill-conceived Rule 70(b)

Instrument to achieve his “self—interest”

limits

ej ectment efforts,

but Hillen must be held t0 act Within the

0f his ﬁduciary capacity, and he knows he can never be a

property, an aspect 0f law he

must be bound

the mandates articulated within the

conﬁned

to respect,

titled

owner 0f a Decedent’s

to his limitations

and

Uniform Probate Code knowing ownership

vested With the heirs upon death, subl'ect only to administration by the ﬁduciary,

is

restricted

by

immediately

empowered to

take

possession upon showing 0f necessity for the satisfaction of creditors’ claims and other interested
persons, but absent such claims 0r interests,

70(b) Instrument,

no

basis to

employ

the un—constitutional entry of a Rule

to wrongfully enable a Personal Representative to eject

m

an occupant and

tenninate a valuable service that beneﬁts the “titled owner” of the heirs.

This appeal seeks reversal 0f the Judgment entered by the lower Court upon the
Pleadings, claiming “ownership”, the fundamental element to prevail in an ejectment Action,

which element Hillen does not possess,
Instrument that

is

as Hillen’s basis for ejectment has relied

void 0f any statutory authority for
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its

entry.

As

upon

the 70(b)

a matter 0f law, only heirs are

the vested and titled owners of a Decedent’s property, and the right of possession has not

been

taken from the heirs. Consequently, Hillen had no standing to allege or prevail upon an ejectment
Action, as he does not, and cannot, hold the exclusive ownership of Decedent’s property, and the

Rule 70(b) Instrument, upon which he has

relied, is

void

if

used to claim Hillen’s ownership to

support an ejectment Action.

This Court must compel the mandatory application of the Statute, as mandated by Hoffer
v.

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), as the statutory scheme (UPC)

ambiguious and remains the controlling law, in the absence of a necessity to
claims and interest deﬁned by Statute. There shall be no severance of the heir’s

and possessory

interests,

and the Personal Representative holds no ownership

is

un—

satisfy creditor

titled

ownership

interest to

advance

an ejectment Action.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of September, 2020.
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